or an existential analytic of Dasein were among the more prominent alternative proposals for a philosophical grounding of the authority of scientifi c knowledge. Relatively few philosophers today believe that the sciences are in need of such philosophical grounding, however; by comparison to logical positivism, phenomenology, or neo-Kantianism, almost everyone today is a naturalist.
The principal issue between naturalists and antinaturalists nowadays is not whether science needs philosophical grounding but whether scientifi c understanding provides suffi cient resources for philosophical understanding. Most antinaturalists accept that the natural sciences are generally well-ordered and not in need of philosophical legitimation. They believe only that philosophical topics (for example, thought, language, agency, ethical assessment, religion) remain that require philosophical resources that natural science cannot provide. Naturalists insist that philosophical work in those domains must be continuous with empirical science, or perhaps even incorporated within scientifi c inquiry.
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Closer examination, however, reveals a fundamental ambiguity in naturalists' claims to continuity between philosophy and the sciences. Within philosophy of science and some parts of philosophy of mind and psychology, "naturalism" is often taken to mean that philosophy must be closely engaged with scientifi c practice. This strain of naturalism has been strongly infl uenced by the demise of logical empiricism, whose accounts of scientifi c norms came to seem utterly divorced from what scientists actually say and do. In response, such naturalists insist that philosophical refl ections on science, life, or mind must engage the work being done in the relevant scientifi c fi elds, or perhaps in empirical studies of the history or sociology of science. A different strain of metaphysical naturalists (principally in philosophy of mind, epistemology, and ethics) has interpreted the continuity between philosophy and science differently. They argue that philosophical understanding of intentionality, knowledge, or morality must ultimately accommodate them within nature as disclosed by the sciences. If intentional content, epistemic authority, or moral norms are to be philosophically respectable, the latter naturalists argue, these must be explicable in terms of the natural laws, causal powers, selective mechanisms, or predictive enhancements discoverable by the sciences. 2 Reasons to seek to connect these two strains of philosophical naturalism are obvious. After all, the only plausible reason to insist that norms must be explicable in terms of laws, mechanisms, or causal powers would be if that is what the world consists of, according to the best scientifi c understanding. The obvious reason to take philosophical inquiry to be continuous with what scientists do would likewise be that empirical sciences are the best available ways to understand the world. Yet too often, such conjunctions of the two strains of naturalism remain unfunded promissory notes. Promissory handwaving has sometimes been quite explicit: John Searle (1983, chap. 10 ) has blithely told us that someday science will demonstrate that intentionality is a biological property, while Patricia Churchland (1986) and Paul Churchland (1989) have each countered that someday very soon, folk psychology will have already been eliminated by computational neuroscience. Haugeland only says that norms of objectivity are physically implemented "somehow" (1998, 317 ). Yet promissory deferrals of reconciliation between naturalists' conceptions of science and of nature also fl ourish where they are not acknowledged. Alexander Rosenberg's "Field Guide to Recent Species of Naturalism" (1996) , for example, trenchantly shows how other philosophers of science appealing to Darwinian principles have not yet made good upon the naturalistic commitments that he joins them in endorsing.
This promissory gap within philosophical naturalism is not just a local problem. Although I cannot argue the point here, a central theme in my recent work (see Rouse 2002) is that much of twentieth-century philosophy has been shaped by a debilitating dualism between nature and the normativity of thought, language, and action. A "dualism" in this sense is "a distinction whose components are [conceived] in terms that make their characteristic relations to one another ultimately unintelligible" (Brandom 1994, 615) . In this context, scientifi c practices have been the pineal gland of contemporary philosophy: the postulated location for the magical reconciliation of what has been conceived from the start as irreconcilable. The sciences are conceived as richly meaningful, normatively binding disclosures of the semantically and normatively inert inexorability of nature, a natural world that nevertheless incorporates those scientifi c practices.
Feminist science studies have often been ambivalent toward this duality between the scientifi c and metaphysical strains of naturalism and the underlying dualism between normativity and nature. Most feminist science studies scholars (see, for example, Nelson 1995 and Wylie 2002) have enthusiastically joined the naturalistic turn toward the study of science as actually practiced. After all, philosophical discussions of objectivity or scientifi c method in abstraction from detailed examination of scientifi c practices have on the one hand obscured gendered, racialized, and colonialist themes in scientifi c work, and on the other hand have been a prominent source for misconstruals of feminist scholarship as hostile to science itself.
3 Feminist scholars have replaced such discussions with accounts of scientifi c objectivity as situated within specifi c practical, historical contexts, and as answerable to concrete responsibilities rather than to abstracted principles. Yet many feminist scholars have been rather less sympathetic toward naturalized conceptions of nature. Metaphysical naturalisms have often had a strongly reductionist bent, with either physical laws, genetic constraints, or adaptationist selection mechanisms playing prominent roles, and these conceptions of nature have too often been used to justify exclusionary or hierarchical practices. Feminists such as Keller 1992 , Birke 1986 , and Haraway 1991 have been strongly and effectively critical of such conceptions of nature and/or their ideological uses.
Constructive feminist responses to these criticisms, however, have reinforced the sense of a one-sided allegiance to the scientifi c strain of philosophical naturalism: while feminist scholars have sometimes defended the metaphysical implications of some scientifi c work (for example, Helen Longino's [1990, 133-61] discussion of Gerald Edelman's work on brain function, Lynn Hankinson Nelson's [1990, 106-53] appropriation of various alternatives to "linear, hierarchical causal models," or Evelyn Fox Keller's [1995, 32-35, 110-12] appeals to the work of Christiane Nüsslein-Vollhard and other developmental biologists on maternal effect inheritance and cytoplasmic rescue), they have been less inclined to connect these metaphysical commitments to their understanding of the situated normativity of science. To this extent, feminist work has also had some of the promissory character exemplifi ed by Searle or the Churchlands: science itself is expected, eventually, to vindicate a favored conception of the natural world, in this case as more complex, interactive, wholistic, and disunifi ed than has been supposed by most metaphysical naturalists.
Yet some work in feminist science studies does offer a more ambitious approach to reintegrating a conception of nature with the concretely situated normativity of scientifi c practices. Recent work by Karen Barad (1996 Barad ( , 1998 Barad ( , 1999 Barad ( , 2000 , and forthcoming) has prominently taken up the challenge of integrating feminist philosophy of science with a feminist ontology. By situating Barad's work in the context of debates over philosophical naturalism, I shall defend two claims about the signifi cance of Barad's accomplishment: fi rst, her proposed "agential realism" (1996, takes important steps toward a successful reconciliation of the two strains of philosophical naturalism; second, Barad's account provides a persuasive criterion for assessing and rejecting the naturalistic credentials of more traditional metaphysical naturalisms.
One way to express the need to reconnect the two strains of naturalism is to ask how to account for scientifi c understanding of nature as part of the nature to be understood. The more or less received answer to this question for recent metaphysical naturalists is that scientifi c understanding involves correct representations of its objects and their modal properties; these representations acquire content from their causal-functional role within thought and action, and acquire warrant from their reliability, predictive success, or the best explanation of their predictive success. I think this conception confronts irremediable problems, although this is not the occasion to defend that claim. I mention the received view primarily to highlight where Barad departs from it.
I interpret Barad as developing a revised conception of metaphysical naturalism. The crucial point at which she departs from other naturalists is in the conception of nature itself as disclosed through scientifi c work. The familiar naturalisms treat nature in terms of regularities, laws, causal powers, or causal-functional roles. Nature so conceived is anormative. The semantic and epistemic normativity governing how one ought to think and talk about the natural world, and the ethical or political normativity of how one ought to act within it, must be understood as either arising from or reducible to an anormative natural world. Although she does not put the point in quite this way, I take Barad to claim instead that nature as revealed by the sciences is itself normatively constituted. This claim needs careful exposition, however, both to clarify the sense of "normativity" being invoked, and to understand Barad's argument for it. Barad starts from a commitment to both strains of naturalism (see Barad 1996 Barad , 1999 . On the one hand, an adequate ontology must be accountable to the scientifi c work through which an understanding of nature is achieved; otherwise, it would be an arbitrary philosophical imposition upon science. On the other hand, such scientifi c work must itself be comprehended as part of nature to be understood. Her position then develops in three distinct steps. First, she argues for the ontological priority of "phenomena" over objects (1996, . She then argues that phenomena in this sense must incorporate conceptual-discursive normativity (1999, 3-7; 1996, 175-79; 1998, 98-112) . Conceptual-discursive norms are not something imposed upon phenomena "by" us, however. On the contrary, we ourselves only become agents/knowers as material components of the larger patterns of natural phenomena (1996, . Thus, Barad neither reduces conceptual-discursive normativity to anormative causal relations, nor imposes already-articulated conceptual norms upon the material world. Instead, she is arguing that the natural world only acquires defi nite boundaries, and concepts only acquire defi nite content, together. Once that conception is in place, Barad goes on to argue that our participation in the phenomena we understand scientifi cally makes ethical and political responsibility integral to conceptual-discursive normativity as well (1996, 183-89; 1998, 110-18) .
Barad begins with the claim that phenomena are constitutive of the natural world (reality). A "phenomenon" in this sense is a reproducible local material arrangement or "set-up." Barad introduces this concept in terms of scientifi c practice, for the most obvious examples of phenomena are experimental arrangements or observational confi gurations. 4 In this respect, her concept has illuminating parallels in the work of Nancy Cartwright (1997 Cartwright ( , 1999 and Ian Hacking (1983 Hacking ( , 1965 ); Cartwright, for example, characterizes "a nomological machine [as] a fi xed (enough) arrangement of components, or factors, with stable (enough) capacities that in the right sort of stable (enough) environment will, with repeated operation, give rise to the kind of regular behavior that we describe in our scientifi c laws" (1997, 66 ). Hacking's (1983) concept of phenomena (as mostly, but not exclusively, created within scientifi c research) is another well-known analogue. Both concepts have an important but less well-known antecedent in Hacking's (1965) concept of a "chance set-up" (including specifi c trials performed with it), which provides the material basis for making intelligible the concept of a long-run frequency. In all of these cases, phenomena (or nomological machines, or set-ups and trials) are material confi gurations of the world, which are frequently but not exclusively the product of scientifi c research.
Nevertheless, a crucial difference exists between Barad's concept of a phenomenon and these otherwise analogous concepts. These analogous concepts take phenomena (nomological machines, chance set-ups, etc.) as "normative" in the limited sense that creating a phenomenon is an achievement (natural phenomena are just those circumstances that happen to meet the standards for such an achievement without needing our intervention). Implicitly, they contrast phenomena with other situations that do not display the same clarity or regularity. For example, Hacking insists that "there are only so many phenomena out there in nature" (1983, 228) ; in the absence of the "noteworthy, discernible" patterns that indicate phenomena, "there is just complexity" (1983, 226) . Similarly, Cartwright distinguishes nomological machines, "concrete systems [of a specifi c kind]" that generate "precise behavior" and make possible "very precise and exact knowledge" from the "vague and imprecise facts" of everyday life (1999, (23) (24) . Haugeland makes a related point about the normativity of scientifi c phenomena in distinguishing science from games like chess. In science, he notes, "the interesting challenge . . . is to ascertain whether there's a game at all or not, and if so, what belongs to it and what doesn't. . . . Finding a [scientifi c] game that is playable is therefore a kind of achievement" (1998, ). Barad's conception of phenomena is more inclusive than theirs, and must be if phenomena are to be "constitutive of reality." Phenomena in her sense, therefore, cannot be normative by contrast to the anormativity of "mere complexity" or arrangements of objects that do not display intelligible patterns.
The fi rst step in understanding Barad's ontology of phenomena is to distinguish the reproducible pattern of a phenomenon from a regularity or Humean constant conjunction. One way to express the difference is that no actual regularity need be involved, for what matters to a phenomenon is not actual repetition but repeatability. Thus, the repeatable pattern of a physical phenomenon is not simply a regularity.
5 Under the right circumstances the pattern would recur, but there need be no actual regularity that it instantiates. Moreover, the pattern is then located in the phenomenon itself, not in the recognition or representation of a regularity.
6 It is central to Barad's concept of phenomena that their repeatability is differential; what matters is not the exact reproduction of the same sequence of events, but the reproduction of a signifi cant pattern despite various differences among instances of the same phenomenon. To repeat an experiment, for example, is not to do the same things exactly, but to try to produce the same pattern in different circumstances, and perhaps by somewhat different means.
The distinctive feature of phenomena as material confi gurations of the world is that they constitute a practical or "constructed" cut between a measuring Hypatia apparatus and a measured "object." No inherent boundary divides an object from its surroundings, for the location of the cut depends upon the confi guration of the apparatus.
7 To see this point, Barad asks that we consider an experiment in which light is scattered from a particle. The scattered light may be directed towards a photographic plate rigidly fi xed in the laboratory and therefore used to record the position, or the light may be directed towards a piece of equipment with movable parts used to record the momentum of the scattered light. The fi rst case essentially describes the process of taking a picture of the particle with a fl ash camera.
In that case, the light is part of the measuring apparatus. In the latter case, the light's momentum is being measured and hence it is part of the object in question. (1996, 171) Nothing about what happens to the light and the particle alone fi xes what property is defi ned by their intra-action, or where a cut occurs between the measuring and the measured components of the phenomenon (Barad coins the term "intra-action" [see 1996, 179 ] to acknowledge that the two poles of the phenomenon, the object and the measuring apparatus, do not exist as such apart from their intra-action).
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A defi ning feature of a phenomenon is that the intra-action between an "object" and its surroundings leaves discernible marks on those surroundings so as to constitute them as a measuring apparatus. What is measured by those marks, however, is not a property of the object in isolation but of the phenomenon as a whole. The position marked by the exposure of the photographic plate to scattered light must be regarded as a characterization of the entire arrangement, and not just of the scattering particle. The need for this referential holism has been most clearly evident in quantum mechanics. On Barad's Bohrian interpretation, position is only a meaningful concept within certain material arrangements, within which momentum is not meaningfully defi nable. The point is not merely epistemic, suggesting a lack of access to a defi nite but unknown position of the particle, but ontological. Under circumstances that mark a relatively defi nite position of a system, that system then has no defi nite momentum. Moreover, as Barad (1996, and forthcoming) has insisted, and I have elaborated elsewhere (Rouse 2002, chap. 8) , this ontological holism of phenomena is not limited to microphysics. Macroscopic phenomena, such as intra-action of an organism with its surroundings, also display comparable tradeoffs, such that concepts such as "gene" or "adaptation" are properly ascribed to whole intra-active phenomena rather than as predetermined properties of defi nite objects.
What are the boundaries of a phenomenon, however? Barad notes that the outside boundary of a phenomenon may seem to extend back indefi nitely: not only are there questions about how far the measuring apparatus per se extends, but also "any particular apparatus is always in the process of intra-acting with other apparatuses, and the enfolding of phenomena . . . into subsequent iterations of particular situated practices constitutes important shifts in the particular apparatus in question" (1998, 102) . This apparent open-endedness of phenomena might then raise the worry that, if properties cannot be ascribed to preexisting objects, then they cannot be adequately localized at all. A similar problem has emerged in discussions of causality: J. L. Mackie (1974) , for instance, has argued that only anthropomorphic interests enable a localizable cause to stand out against the background of the properly specifi ed "total cause."
There is both something constructively insightful in this objection and something fundamentally mistaken. The insight is to recognize that a phenomenon in Barad's sense is not just a larger, more complex object in the world, but a meaningful confi guration of the world. It therefore has no intrinsic outside boundary. The mistake is to overlook the ways in which a phenomenon can be confi gured so as to confer defi nite intelligibility and more or less defi nite boundaries upon a more localized situation. Thus, as Cartwright notes in her discussion of relatively stable regularities, the conditions that shield the nomological pattern from interference are a crucial component of what she calls the "nomological machine" (1999, 50) . Whether those shielding conditions are created by an experimenter for that purpose, as is the Hertz box that protects a Magnetic Resonance Imaging device from other magnetic infl uences, or are "already there," as is the relative gravitational isolation of the solar system, they (and the specifi c "external" interferences that they are able to block) are part of the arrangement that constitutes the phenomenon and the locally intelligible pattern that it manifests.
We can now see how to reconcile Barad's insistence that "phenomena are constitutive of reality" (1996, 176) with Hacking's, Cartwright's, and Haugeland's more restrictive analogues to her concept. The latter insist that not every situation in the world constitutes a phenomenon, indeed that very few situations do so, and those only with great diffi culty. On Barad's more inclusive conception, the world is articulated by overlapping, intra-acting phenomena, but most of these fail to disclose any pattern of local intelligibility. These confused intra-actions that seem to manifest only undifferentiated complexity still mark the limit case of a phenomenon, however. Consider an experimental run that generates no clear signal standing out from background noise. We might say of such an experiment that "nothing was there" to be found. But the unintelligible complexity thereby disclosed only shows up through the intelligible confi guration of the experiment itself as a locally reproducible arrangement that would have disclosed a signifi cant pattern had the circumstances been different. It is in this sense that phenomena are constitutive of the world "in its entirety," in their complex, intra-active play of intelligibility and unintelligibility.
The question remains, however, what it means for phenomena to constitute patterns of local intelligibility, or for phenomena to exhibit "meaningful patterns." In unpacking these locutions, we will recognize two more of Barad's contributions, namely her insistence upon the prosthetic performativity of the "agencies of observation" (1998, (98) (99) (100) (101) (102) (103) (104) (105) (106) (107) (108) (109) (110) , and her account of the conceptualdiscursive dimension of scientifi c intelligibility. Consider again the measuring apparatus whose intra-action with a measured object enables a phenomenon to display a pattern of intelligibility such as a defi nite measurement or a causal relation. The measuring apparatus cannot just include an experimental set-up, shielding conditions, and a target physically marked by its intra-action with the object. By themselves, the marks of such an intra-action such as Uranus's deviations from an elliptical trajectory around the sun in the vicinity of Neptune display no intelligibility whatsoever. For there to be intelligibility in the phenomenon, the measuring apparatus has to constitute what Robert Sokolowski once called a "dative of manifestation" (1978, 128) , that to which it is intelligible. It is here that anti-naturalists typically invoke a distinctive role for a knowing subject as naturalistically inexplicable. Mind, consciousness, or, in a revealing case, Bas van Fraassen's (1980) appeal to the human organism as the privileged locus of observation, are supposedly essential to any genuine disclosure of the world as meaningful.
Van Fraassen is especially instructive in this context, because he attempts to incorporate a naturalistic element within his constructive empiricism by insisting that science itself should determine what is observable: "what is observable . . . is a function of facts about us qua organisms in the world" (1980, (57) (58) ). Yet what van Fraassen thereby mistakenly assumes prior to any scientifi c considerations is that the relevant boundaries for a scientifi c measuring system must be individual human organisms (a point on which he and W. V. O. Quine [1960] oddly agree). For a scientifi c naturalist, those boundaries should be specifi ed from within scientifi c practices and measurement interactions themselves. For a feminist, moreover, van Fraassen's identifi cation of knowers with their supposedly "natural" bodies is deeply problematic.
Barad responds to both concerns by asking how the "agencies of observation" are themselves constituted as a material component of a phenomenon (1996, 169-173; 1998, 94-103) . She begins with the whole complex set of arrangements that make up the material apparatus of an experimental or observational set-up. This apparatus typically includes the detector marked by its intra-action with the object, the preparatory apparatus sometimes needed to confi gure the object to intra-act in the right way, the shielding of the phenomenon from intrusive noise, and the interpretive apparatus that enables these marks on the detector to be manifest as effects measuring the object in some defi nite respect. This apparatus cannot be conceived as a group of objects or tools then assembled into a more complex tool, for their unifi cation in a repeatable phenomenon is a matter of how they intra-act performatively:
Apparatuses are not preexisting or fi xed entities; they are themselves constituted through particular practices that are perpetually open to rearrangements, rearticulations, and other reworkings. This is part of the creativity and diffi culty of doing science: getting the instrumentation to work in a particular way for a particular purpose (which is always open to the possibility of being changed during the experiment as different insights are gained). (Barad 1998, 102) To the extent that human bodies fi t into this performatively constituted apparatus, they do so not as natural objects characterizable in isolation, but as constitutive components of this dynamically functioning apparatus.
9 Human agency is always prosthetically extended and performative in its contribution to the "dative of manifestation" constituted in scientifi c practices.
This iterative, normative performativity of scientifi c practices is indispensable to how they allow the world to be intelligible. Consider again the example of the pattern displayed by the anelliptical deviations in the orbit of Uranus that exhibit its gravitational intra-action with Neptune. I earlier claimed that the shielded two-body "apparatus" composed of the sun and Uranus is not suffi cient by itself to allow the gravitational capacities of Neptune to be intelligible. Yet Barad would also reject non-naturalist invocations of mind, consciousness, interests, or shared presuppositions of a scientifi c community as the differencemaker for intelligibility. So how does the incorporation of material systems such as planetary orbits within a larger performative apparatus display them as intelligible without magical invocations of subjectivity? The fi rst step is to incorporate within the phenomenon the prosthetically embodied practices of registering positions, tracking them successively, transposing them into trajectories, and projecting these trajectories geometrically or analytically. Only when these practices are in place is there a manifest pattern that displays the intelligibility of orbits as marks of gravitational intra-action. "Practices" in this sense are thus not regularities of behavior but further patterns of intra-action. 10 We can now understand, at long last, the sense in which Barad is characterizing natural phenomena as irreducibly normative. She is certainly not reverting to premodern conceptions of nature as inherently structured by already-determinate norms. Natural phenomena are instead normative in the sense that practices of correcting, refi ning, teaching, and otherwise differentiating correct from incorrect performance are implicitly part of the phenomenon. These practical intra-actions need never come to rest upon some fi nal regularity.
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Indeed, I argue elsewhere (Rouse 2002, chap. 9 ) that genuinely normative (and thereby intelligible) intra-action requires that it not do so. The possibility of further correction is constitutive of pattern-recognition as opposed to mere differential-responsiveness (Haugeland 1998, chap. 11 , insightfully discusses the interdependence of pattern and pattern-recognition). I shall later return to the question of what such openness to correction amounts to.
Before doing so, however, we need to turn from the prosthetically extended embodiment of the "agencies of observation" to their conceptual and discursive character. Barad argues that phenomena are always "material-discursive" (1998, (104) (105) (106) (107) (108) (109) (110) . I take that to mean that the interpretive aspects of the "agential" side of the phenomenon always implicate the phenomenon within a fi eld of discursive practice. To see what that means, consider again Barad's example of a particle-scattering experiment. A measuring apparatus whose parts are rigidly fi xed to one another is needed in order for the intra-active marking of that apparatus to measure position, and reference to such an apparatus at some point is indispensable to the intelligible use of the term "position." Thus, Barad endorses Bohr's insistence that "descriptive concepts obtain their meaning by reference to a particular physical apparatus which in turn marks a constructed cut between the 'object' and the 'agencies of observation'. . . . For Bohr, measurement and description entail one another" (Barad 1996, 172) . 12 We need to understand this "mutual entailment" in both directions. Description requires measurement for the reasons I have just cited. It is only within a specifi c confi guration of apparatus that a concept acquires determinate content and applicability. The specifi c performative confi guration of the apparatus, for example with internally fi xed parts and use appropriate to that arrangement, determines what is being measured and described, and in which respect. Measurement in turn requires the discursive practices that would permit appropriate description. Barad's conception of semantic content is broadly inferentialist. What allows the mark of a photon on a photographic plate to measure position, for example, is its (possible) inferential role in a subsequent chain of performances that are held normatively accountable to appropriate intra-actions with that mark. The inferentially accountable use of concepts like position is an indispensable component of the interpretive apparatus belonging to a phenomenon, through which the phenomenon becomes intelligible. Barad thus extends Wilfrid Sellars's (1997) familiar point about perceptual identifi cations to apply to practical intra-action with an apparatus: a parrot that utters "red" in the presence of red surfaces has not actually used the concept rather than just the sound, unless it can also use it inferentially in other contexts; likewise, a mark on an experimental apparatus is not a measurement of position unless it is involved in an appropriate inferential nexus. Discursive practices as characterized by a pragmatically inferentialist semantics (see Brandom 1994) are thus an indispensable component of any intelligible phenomenon, and a crucial part of Barad's "agencies of observation" (Rouse 2002, chaps. 6-8) .
This appeal to the inferential normativity of discursive practices reinforces rather than undermines Barad's commitment to a broadly naturalistic orientation, because she takes meaning and its interpretation to be thoroughly natural, that is, material, phenomena. On her conception, I argue, Davidsonian radical interpretation or Brandom's "discursive practices" should also be understood as measurement intra-actions, comparable to the particle-scattering example already mentioned. Semantic interpretation can only be undertaken toward some material system: it must begin with marks on bodies, whether these are movements, vocalizations, or inscriptions. Moreover, these marks on bodies are only meaningful in relation to the publicly accessible circumstances that occasion them. Then two alternative practical cuts can show such performances to be semantically intelligible. If the occasioning circumstances are part of the agencies of observation, the response to these utterances interprets them as meaningful in a language antecedently understood. This is the familiar model of radical interpretation. Alternatively, the utterances can themselves be part of a measuring apparatus: given a specifi c interpretation in the home language, those marks are a measure of their surroundings (roughly, do those circumstances, including auxiliary assumptions, confi rm or falsify this expression?). The marks then express part of the semantic signifi cance of those circumstances, namely their correct description in these words. Thus, from Barad's broadly naturalistic perspective, meaning and truth are comparable to position and momentum, organism and environment, or adaptive trait and niche: the meaning of an expression and the correlative truth about the world are not simultaneously determinate, for the determinacy of each requires mutually incompatible practical confi gurations of the world (for more extensive discussion of these points, see Rouse 2002, chap. 8) .
The material and discursive aspects of a phenomenon are thus also comparable in their irreducible normativity. There is nothing about the letters p-o-s-i-t-i-o-n or the sound po-'zi-shun that magically (see Wheeler 2000) connects them to what is disclosed in measurements using apparatus with internally fi xed parts; only their actual ongoing use in such circumstances, in reliably recognizable and normatively accountable ways, can account for their discursive signifi cance. The same is true of other marks on bodies that are the material indications of a phenomenon. Thus, when I spoke earlier about how utterances can be normatively accountable to the outcome of a measurement, I chose quite carefully the phrase "appropriate intra-actions with [a] mark [on a photographic plate]." One cannot say that later inferential uses of the term "position" are accountable to the physical mark itself, because that leaves unspecifi ed in what respect they are accountable to it. Nor can one say that they are accountable to the position of the mark on a photographic plate, because "position" is only being articulated through these inferential relations. To make perceptual recognition of the mark the crucial factor will not do, for that would be a return to an empiricist foundationalism. What one needs instead are material intra-actions with marks on bodies (such as establishing a reference frame, marking off and counting equal unit divisions, standardizing the units, and so forth), along with practices of differentiating correct and incorrect performance. Those practical intra-actions are thereby held accountable to what is at stake in their performance.
This reading of Barad does not substitute a normative foundationalism for a now-discredited empiricist foundationalism, by interpreting measurement practices in terms of accountability to something at stake in the practice. What is "at stake" in the practice need not be articulated or agreed upon in advance in order for it to govern the intra-actions that constitute a measurement; it can govern the practice, without serving as a normative "given." Alasdair MacIntyre has helpfully expressed this point in terms of the normative authority of traditions: "What constitutes a tradition is a confl ict of interpretations of that tradition, a confl ict which itself has a history susceptible of rival interpretations. If I am a Jew, I have to recognize that the tradition of Judaism is partly constituted by a continuous argument over what it means to be a Jew" (1980, 62) .
Being a Jew in this sense is a normative status rather than a determinate matter of fact. The normative signifi cance of this status is sustained by its mattering to all parties to get it right about what is appropriately at stake here for all of them, even though they have not yet reached, may never reach, and in some cases may not even seek agreement about what that is. Moreover, it matters that these stakes be binding on everyone involved. The intelligibility of anyone's participation in a practice turns on something being at stake for everyone in getting it right. That does not mean that the intelligibility of practices depends upon the possibility of ultimate agreement about and conformity to what those stakes are. Rather, it depends upon an implicit mutual recognition of and by those to whom the practice matters, such that they (ought to) hold themselves responsible for their different interpretations, and accountable to one another.
This appeal to agential responsibility to explicate the objectivity of natural phenomena and their scientifi c articulation is one of at least two important respects in which Barad's work distinctively contributes to feminist theory and feminist science studies. Barad's conception of objectivity as agential responsibility belongs to a tradition of feminist treatments of objectivity in terms of responsibility or kindred notions (see, for example, Haraway 1991, chap. 9; Code 1991; Longino 1992; Nelson 1993; Wylie 1999) . The second distinctively feminist feature that I shall highlight in her analysis is her identifi cation of the locus of such responsibility as a prosthetically embodied engagement in material-discursive practices.
Barad puts the fi rst point this way: accountability to the world as material "is not about representations of an independent reality, but about the real conse-quences, interventions, creative possibilities, and responsibilities of intra-acting within the world" (1996, 188) . Knowing the world by participating in the confi guration of phenomena makes one accountable for all of their consequences. More traditional conceptions of objectivity limit the responsibility of knowers. Knowers then need only attend to the correct functioning of the apparatus for immediate epistemic purposes, accepting and accommodating the data (the specifi c marks on the apparatus that indicate the outcome of an experiment or observation) within their overall economy of belief and research practice.
Barad's conception of objective accountability is more encompassing. Scientifi c practice not only makes the world intelligible in specifi c ways and in its own terms, but also contributes to the foreclosure of other patterns of intelligibility, and to other agential engagements with the world. Moreover, just as the objects studied do not interact in a vacuum but only within a specifi c confi guration of apparatus, so scientifi c practice does not occur in isolation: "science as a social practice is conceptually, methodologically, and epistemologically allied along particular axes of power" (Barad 1996, 186) . Responsible ("objective") science is accountable not just to the narrowly scientifi c outcomes of the phenomena it participates in but for the specifi c boundaries, exclusions, and impositions that it thereby helps to realize in the world, that is, for the full range of consequences that it helps to bring about. Barad is not the fi rst feminist theorist to recognize that power relations and their political consequences are integral to scientifi c understanding and should be taken into account as part of the political responsibility incurred through scientifi c work. But Barad shows more clearly how to recognize and account for these dimensions of science without reducing or subordinating scientifi c understanding to predetermined structures or relations of power. Indeed, part of Barad's central contribution to feminist science studies is that she shows not just how feminist politics are integral to responsible science but also how science integrally contributes to an adequate feminist analysis and criticism of power and domination.
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The second distinctively feminist theme in Barad's work to which I call attention is her interpretation of the loci of such agential responsibility. Understanding and agency are traditionally located in the rational, human subject and/or the natural body she inhabits and partly controls. The self-contained character of the subject would then be defi ned by inherent boundaries between self and other, whether in the self's inner deliberations or in outer bodily performances. For Barad, no such inherent boundaries exist: "what gets defi ned as a 'subject' (or 'object') and what gets defi ned as an 'apparatus' is intra-actively constituted within specifi c practices" (1998, 105) . The locus of responsibility is thus a prosthetically embodied, performatively constituted agency: "we are responsible for the world in which we live not because it is an arbitrary construction of our choosing, but because agential reality is sedimented out of particular practices that we have a role in shaping" (Barad 2000, 247) . That recognition leaves a conceptual and practical space for understanding and being accountable to nonhuman agency, not because no differences between human and other agencies exist but because agency is not an all-or-nothing affair. There are many forms of intra-active involvement in the ongoing reproduction of phenomena, and many ways in which we are responsible to and for them. As Barad concludes: "learning how to intra-act responsibly within the world means understanding that we are not the only active beings-though this is never justifi cation for defl ecting that responsibility onto other entities. The acknowledgement of nonhuman agency does not lessen human accountability; on the contrary, it means that accountability requires that much more attentiveness to existing power asymmetries" (1998, ). Barad's feminist, naturalist account of responsibility recognizes and responds to the embodiment of human agency in specifi c settings that sustain and transform other agents' fi eld of possible action. Responsible agency involves recognizing one's own participation in the reproduction of power relations, acknowledging its consequences, and holding oneself accountable to those for whom one's actions are consequential.
I can now conclude with Barad's challenge to other metaphysical naturalists. She has abandoned one of the core commitments of most contemporary naturalist metaphysics, namely that nature as disclosed by the natural sciences is anormative. On her account, science does not construct a representation of anormative nature but instead actively reconfi gures the world as already conceptually articulated and politically consequential. Science both sediments a history of prior intra-action and effectively shapes the fi eld of possible subsequent action by the various human and non-human "agencies" it encompasses. Barad cogently summarizes this agential conception of the world: "the new ontology offered here also makes it possible to take account of the material dimensions of constraints and exclusions without presuming matter to be a fi xed ground existing outside of time, history, or culture. . . . Reference to the material constraints and exclusions and the material dimensions of power is possible within the framework of agential realism because "materiality" refers to agential reality, which is explicitly not nature-outside-of-culture" (1998, 109) . She has, however, given up on a traditional metaphysics of nature so as to retain other core naturalistic commitments that she takes to be more fundamental, but in confl ict with claims of nature's anormativity. In particular, she gives priority to comprehending human agency and understanding as (components of) natural, material phenomena.
In fairness to Barad, she has nowhere asserted that her position is naturalistic, or that she endorses any of the specifi c theses that I characterize as naturalistic commitments. I assert, however, that it makes good sense of Barad's program and her core commitments as she expresses them to connect them in this way to the naturalistic tradition in philosophy. Among the naturalistic commitments that Barad maintains, sometimes more stringently, are: the continuity between philosophy and science; the insistence that philosophical explica-tion of science be accountable to ongoing scientifi c practice; a thoroughgoing materialism (albeit in the sense of agential materiality, not a more traditional physicalism); and the rejection of any appeal to the magical or supernatural. Perhaps more importantly, Barad's account offers a constructive reintegration of the two strains of naturalism: a scientifi c understanding of nature through agential engagement in the construction-and-articulation of phenomena is clearly and straightforwardly a part of the nature it makes intelligible, which is constituted as phenomena.
To those who still wish to retain a more traditionally naturalistic metaphysics, for which normativity must be reducible to or supervenient upon physical objects and their causal interactions or lawful regularities, Barad's work then offers a fundamental challenge. Any naturalistic metaphysics must incorporate the understanding of nature within nature as understood, and must accept that scientifi c practices at their best embody (part of) whatever understanding of nature has thus far been attained. The challenge is then to display the connections between the concepts employed in their metaphysics (such as objects, causes, functions, or laws), and the material apparatus through which scientifi c practices could hold those concepts accountable to marks on bodies. Barad herself puts the challenge this way: "Any attempt to reinstate materiality as natural [in the more traditional sense] would be exposed as quite bizarre, since this would be to assign materiality to a place outside the real, . . . the objective referent [of scientifi c practices]" (1998, 109) . The suspicion underlying this challenge is that other metaphysical naturalists illegitimately help themselves to their core concepts. When naturalists, for example, treat conceptual or ethical normativity as supervening upon a supposedly non-normative base of objects and properties or causal or law-governed interactions, they at least tacitly invoke the authority of science as underwriting this conception of the natural world. Barad's counterclaim would be that their uses of concepts such as "object," "cause," "law," or "function" cannot be supported by the appropriate use of material and conceptual apparatus, and thus cannot legitimately claim to refl ect a broadly scientifi c and non-supernaturalist engagement with the world.
Notes
Earlier versions of this paper were presented at conferences on "Feminism and Naturalism" at Washington University and the University of Missouri at St. Louis in September 1999, and on "Sciences as Social Practices" at Carleton University in March 2000. Many thanks to the participants for helpful comments. I have also benefi ted from helpful comments by Karen Barad, and by three anonymous referees for Hypatia.
1. One can, of course, espouse naturalism in some domains and not others. The considerations that lead one to naturalism may be quite general, but the case must be made separately for naturalizing the mind, knowledge, ethics, or any other domain.
2. Philosophers have worked out the commitment to explicate semantic, epistemic, or ethical norms naturalistically in manydifferent ways. First, the relation between the norms to be naturalized and "nature" has been variously construed as elimination, reduction, supervenience (of more than one kind), predictive enhancement (such that it is appropriate to treat a system as responsive to norms if its behavior thereby becomes more predictable), or mere compatibility (this last variation exemplifi es the homages to naturalism offered by many philosophers who reject the full assimilation of philosophy to natural science). Second, naturalists also appeal to diverse conceptions of the natural world, in terms of natural laws, causal powers, Darwinian evolution, micro physical entities, or possible worlds. When coupled with their separate application in different philosophical domains, these variations turn metaphysical naturalism into a hydra-headed position.
3. Elisabeth Lloyd (1996) notes that constructive feminist demystifi cations of scientifi c work may mistakenly seem "anti-scientifi c" if one's conception of science is abstracted from attempts to clarify the strengths and weaknesses of actual inquiry.
4. Although Barad begins with experimental arrangements, we shall see that her conception of phenomena is not limited to them; she is using experimental setups deliberately arranged to produce a specifi c pattern of interaction as a model for understanding causal relations more generally.
5. Nor can phenomena in Barad's sense be identifi ed with regularities across possible worlds, although I will not address that variation here. I have discussed such modal regularities in Rouse 2002, chaps. 8-9. 6. Strictly speaking, a Baradian phenomenon does incorporate the recognition of a pattern, but the capacity for recognition is itself part of the apparatus that belongs to the phenomenon, and the phenomenon is then not just the regularity itself, but the larger confi guration of the world that enables the regularity to be manifest (see the discussion below, and in Rouse 2002, chap. 8) . This point also explains why Cartwright sees regularities as properties of nomological machines and Hacking ascribes long-run frequencies to chance set-ups.
7. This point indicates why Barad takes phenomena to be constitutive of reality, rather than understanding the world as composed of objects. She argues that the establishment of defi nite boundaries to an object presupposes its belonging within the larger confi guration of a phenomenon.
8. Barad talks about measurement within the context of scientifi c practice, but her characterization applies to causal intra-actions more generally. Any causal intra-action is implicitly a measurement in Barad's sense: the capacities of one component of the intra-active phenomenon (the cause) are implicitly measured by the marks produced upon another component (the effect). In asking what determines the boundaries of object and apparatus in a measurement intra-action, she is also inquiring into how the world has determinate causal structure more generally.
9. To measure the capacities and characteristics of human bodies in the way that van Fraassen suggests would itself require a different apparatus, and the bodies measured would be on the other (the "object") side of the relevant practical cut. The point is not that such measurements of human capacities are irrelevant to the interpretation of measurement outcomes, as Barad notes: "any particular apparatus is always in the process of intra-acting with other apparatuses, and the enfolding of phenomena . . . into subsequent iterations of particular situated practices constitute important shifts in the particular apparatus in question and therefore in the nature of the intra-actions that result in the production of new phenomena, and so on" (1998, 102) . Rather, the point is that it requires a different phenomenon to measure the body as object, and still others to connect the two phenomena together.
10. The distinction between practices (in this sense) and regularities of behavior is developed in Rouse 2002, chap. 5. 11. Robert Brandom drew an instructive distinction between normative social practices and objective regularities, arguing that "we can envisage a situation in which every social practice of [a] community has as its generating response a performance which must be in accord with another social practice" (1979, , so that such practices are irreducible to regularities, and hence are constitutively normative. I am arguing that Barad's account of phenomena collapses Brandom's distinction in the other direction: she is claiming that supposedly objective regularities (including the "regular" persistence of objects and properties) acquire their character only as constituents of practices. If you fi nd this view initially strange, consider it a response to the central point introduced by Saul Kripke (1982) : no fi nite sequence of events constitutes a defi nite regularity apart from the norms governing its correct or incorrect continuation. Kripke was primarily addressing governing rules (such as a mathematical function) rather than exhibited rules (such as a natural regularity), but parallel issues arise in the regularist case (for more extensive discussion, see Rouse 2002, chaps. 6, 8) .
12. Bohr spoke of "classical" descriptive concepts, which he distinguished from quantum mechanical concepts. Don Howard (1994) gives a speculative but highly plausible reconstruction of Bohr's conception of classical concepts. I omit the term "classical," because I think that Barad's account of how descriptive concepts are implicated in phenomena does not depend upon Bohr's more contestable view of the ineliminability of classical concepts.
13. The distinctive features of Barad's political theory are, however, beyond the scope of this paper (see Barad 1996 Barad , 1998 Barad , 1999 .
